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Abstract 
The paper re-examines Sweden’s price level targeting during the 1930s which is regarded as 
a precursor of today’s inflation targeting. According to conventional wisdom the Riksbank 
was the first central bank to adopt price level targeting as the guideline for its activities, 
although in practice giving priority to exchange rate stabilisation over price level 
stabilisation. On the basis of econometric analysis (Bayesian VAR) and the evaluation of 
new archival sources we come to a more skeptical conclusion. Our results suggest that it is 
hard to reconcile the Riksbank’s striving for a fixed exchange rate with the claim that it 
adopted price level targeting. This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the 
1930s as a decade of great policy innovations. 
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1. Introduction 
Sweden’s monetary policy during the 1930s is one of the most fascinating episodes in 
Europe’s economic history of the twentieth century. In late September 1931, when Sweden 
suspended the gold standard, the Finance Minister made the public statement that from now 
on monetary policy would be aimed at stabilizing the internal price level, and judging from 
the record, the goal was achieved rather successfully. It is also impressive to see how 
intensely contemporaries were debating monetary policy during those years. Eminent 
economists such as Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin were participating in this 
public discussion. 
Because of the remarkable statement by the Finance Minister and because Sweden 
recovered more rapidly from the depression than most other European countries, its 
monetary policy has repeatedly been invoked as a new model, most enthusiastically by 
Irving Fisher (1935). In recent times, it has also been cited as a sort of precursor of today’s 
inflation targeting (Svensson 1995, Bernanke et al. 1999). In this paper, we examine the 
question of whether or not the Swedish central bank (Riksbank) was in fact targeting the 
price level. 
Surprisingly, inspite of an ongoing admiration for Sweden’s record during the 1930s, this 
question has only rarely been studied systematically. Most economists or economic 
historians content themselves with making a short reference to this episode. Besides 
contemporary scholars who wrote a series of studies only Lars Jonung and his collaborators 
have seriously approached the topic (Jonung 1979a, 1979b, Berg and Jonung 1999, Fregert 
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and Jonung 2004).1 This new research has led to a strong revision of Fisher’s enthusiastic 
view. Jonung and Fregert (2004) acknowledge that the Riksbank became ‘the first and so far 
the only central bank to have adopted price stabilisation or price level targeting as the 
guideline for its activities’. But they also point out that the Riksbank ‘appears to have given 
priority to exchange rate stabilisation over price stabilisation’. 
Based on new econometric and narrative evidence, we propose a different revision of 
Fisher’s view. While confirming the Riksbank’s strong bias towards exchange rate 
stabilisation, we argue that this finding can hardly be reconciled with the claim that the 
Riksbank adopted price level targeting as a norm restricting its actions in one or another 
way. Our results suggest that the Riksbank did not reorient its policy after 1931, but 
continued to follow the monetary policy of the Bank of England and was targeting the 
sterling rate of the krona. Although being a major innovation in the history of Swedish 
economic thought, price level targeting had no practical importance for the decisions of the 
Riksbank in the 1930s. There was a large gap between official declarations made by 
politicians and government officials and actual policies pursued by the central bank – the 
same gap that has recently been observed with respect to the exchange rate policies of 
emerging markets (Calvo and Reinhart 2002, Reinhart and Rogoff 2004, Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2005). Swedish monetary policy was essentially made in London, before as 
well as after the devaluation of the krona in September 1931. 
This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the interwar years as a decade of 
great policy innovations. Obviously, even in Sweden, where eminent economists came up 
with original and far-sighted ideas, policy makers were reluctant to abandon the notion that 
there was no alternative to a fixed exchange rate regime. The paper standard was regarded 
as a temporary measure, but not as a great opportunity to pursue a more autonomous 
monetary policy. The most important argument in favor of a conservative approach was that 
the exporting sectors would be negatively affected by a floating exchange rate. Only in the 
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last quarter of the twentieth century, this conviction gave way to a more positive view 
towards exchange rate flexibility. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two gives a survey of the 
exchange rate regimes adopted by Sweden and its Scandinavian neighbors. Section three 
summarises the official declarations which are the basis for the claim that the Riksbank in 
fact adopted price level targeting. Sections four and five present our new econometric and 
narrative evidence. The paper ends with a short conclusion. 
 
2. Scandinavian monetary policy during the interwar years 
To capture the basic features of Swedish monetary policy during the interwar years, we first 
consider the Scandinavian context.2 As for most countries, the monetary history of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the interwar period can be divided into four phases 
corresponding to different international monetary regimes (Figure 1).3 In the first phase, 
beginning in 1919 and characterised by floating exchange rates, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden were trying to bring their currencies back to the gold standard at the prewar parity. 
The three countries, however, considerably varied with respect to the point of time at which  
they achieved this goal. Sweden was first, the krona was tied back to gold in April 1924, 
one year before Great Britain took this step. Denmark and Norway experienced more 
problems, mainly because of a particularly severe banking crisis in the early 1920s. The de 
jure restoration of the gold standard occurred in Denmark in January 1927, and in Norway 
in May 1928. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The second period lasted from the restoration of the gold standard until its fall in September 
1931. All three Scandinavian countries followed the devaluation of the pound within days. 
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For Denmark, the main reason was the high share of exports to the British market. No less 
than 60 percent of Danish agricultural products were shipped to the British ports. Norway’s 
decision to suspend the gold standard was motivated by the importance of sterling for the 
shipping business. For the Swedish Riksbank, the main problem was of financial nature. In 
the course of 1930, some Swedish commercial banks had accumulated a substantial foreign 
short-term deficit in order to provide liquidity to Ivar Kreuger. When the German banking 
crisis broke out in July 1931 triggering a general rush for liquidity, the banks covered their 
foreign short-term deficit by buying exchange reserves from the central bank. Accordingly, 
when the British pound was devalued and another attack on the krona was launched, the 
Riksbank had too few reserves to defend the old parity. 
In the third phase, lasting from fall of 1931 to summer of 1933, the currencies were 
officially floating. The Scandinavian countries chose different paths. Denmark engineered a 
competitive devaluation in January 1933 after New Zealand, its main competitor in the 
British market for agricultural products, had done so. When suspending the gold standard 
the Norwegian and Swedish authorities declared that they would aim at stabilizing the 
purchasing power of the currency. In Sweden, this decision was followed by concrete steps: 
the Riksbank constructed a new consumer price index, while the government, the Riksdag 
and several eminent economists extensively discussed monetary policy matters in public. In 
Norway, by contrast, the official statement of September 1931 was not followed by the 
elaboration of a new framework. 
The fourth phase began with the decision of all three Scandinavian countries to tie their 
currencies to sterling. The peg lasted from July 1933 to the outbreak of World War II: the 
Danish krone was 23 percent above the old sterling parity, the Norwegian krone ten percent, 
and the Swedish krona seven percent. The peg was questioned a few times. In 1935, Danish 
farmers were demanding a second competitive devaluation, and in late 1936, some Swedish 
economists pleaded a revaluation of the currency after British wholesale prices had 
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increased over several months. In the end, however, the pegs were maintained at the same 
parity. 
 
3. The official declarations 
The claim that the Riksbank adopted price level targeting after the suspension of the gold 
standard in September 1931 rests on two pillars. The first one is the relative price stability 
Sweden enjoyed after abandoning the gold standard. Whereas the US and the gold bloc 
countries continued to experience deflation well into the 1930s, Sweden’s domestic price 
level remained almost perfectly stable after September 1931. Only in two periods there were 
notable deviations from price stability as measured by the index of consumption constructed 
by the Riksbank: in early 1933 and in the first two quarters of 1937 (Figure 2). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The second pillar consists of a series of official declarations and reports. It all started on 
Sunday evening, 27 September 1931, when Finance Minister Felix Hamrin of the ruling 
center-right coalition declared that from now on ‘monetary policy should be aimed at 
stabilizing the internal purchasing power of the krona by all means possible’.4 The 
statement, based on ideas of Knut Wicksell and partly drafted by Swedish economists, was 
supposed to reassure the public that the authorities would prevent inflation after the 
suspension of the gold standard. Hamrin also declared that Sweden wanted to return to the 
gold standard as soon as possible. The departure from gold was seen as a temporary 
measure. 
Hamrin’s short sentence soon became the basis for an intense debate among politicians, 
central bankers and economists. The Riksbank responded to the new situation by sending a 
detailed questionnaire to three eminent Swedish economists, Gustav Cassel, David 
Davidson and Eli Heckscher.5 In their answers, returned at the end of October, they agreed 
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on a number of issues. In particular, they all recommended postponing the restoration of the 
gold standard as long as international financial markets were in turmoil, and favored 
stabilizing prices at the current level, stressing that the exchange rate should not be fixed, 
but be used to achieve this goal.6 Also in October, the Riksbank constructed a new 
consumer price index on a weekly basis in order to have a more accurate picture of the 
dynamics of price movements. Finally, on 11 February 1932, the Riksbank explained in a 
letter requesting the government to renew the provisional suspension of the gold standard 
how it interpreted the new monetary program.7 Its intention, the Board wrote, was to 
stabilise the average level of domestic consumer prices, but it also pointed out that it would 
allow a moderate increase of the Riksbank’s price index within a certain range insofar as it 
was caused by external movements such as rising import and export prices or appreciating 
foreign exchange rates, whereas an increase of the price index caused by domestic inflation 
would not be tolerated. The Board also emphasised that indicators other than price indices 
were being taken into consideration, particularly conditions affecting productivity and 
stocks in various industries. 
As the Riksbank was under the direct control of both houses of the Swedish parliament 
(Riksdag), politicians of all parties began to be involved into the debate.8 The Banking 
Committee, being in charge of overseeing the Riksbank, wrote several memoranda and 
urged the Governing Board to account for its actions. In May 1932, the Committee authored 
a detailed report aimed at developing a more precise monetary program which became the 
new basis for all further discussions.9 Three points are worth mentioning. First, the 
Committee rejected the idea of tying the krona to gold or the British pound and argued that 
the domestic price level and ‘the needs of our own economy’ should be the starting point for 
monetary policy. Second, it wanted the Riksbank to prevent both inflation and deflation, but 
also advocated a moderate rise of the price level. And third, the Committee encouraged the 
Riksbank to keep interest rates as low as possible. In June 1933, the Banking Committee 
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published another report drawing from the recommendations of a committee of experts.10 
The Banking Committee gave the instruction to engineer a rise of the internal wholesale 
price level without causing inflation, and provided the Riksbank with more independence by 
stating explicitly that it was up to the central bank how to reach this goal. Besides, the report 
also stated that the krona should not be fixed to gold or the British pound for the time 
being.11 
Taken together, it is beyond doubt that these official declarations by the Swedish political 
authorities represented a major innovation in Europe’s history of monetary policy. For the 
first time, there was a serious public discussion about how to stabilise the internal price 
level in the absence of an international monetary system of fixed exchange rates. The crucial 
question, however, is whether or not this discussion had any practical meaning for the 
policy of the Riksbank. Berg and Jonung (1999) as well as Fregert and Jonung (2004) come 
to the conclusion that the Riksbank in fact adopted price level targeting and therefore had to 
accept certain restrictions. The following two sections try to develop a more skeptical view 
of Sweden’s monetary policy in the 1930s. 
 
4. Narrative evidence and descriptive statistics 
Our first set of evidence suggesting that the Swedish central bank did not implement what 
was said in public by the Finance Ministry and the Banking Committee of the Riksdag 
consists of a series of statements by the Riksbank governor Ivar Rooth. We are aware of the 
fact that there were other personalities trying to determine the course of Sweden’s monetary 
policy. In particular, Ernst Wigforss, Social Democratic Finance Minister since the fall of 
1932, advocated a stabilization of the domestic price level.12 Likewise, Dag Hammarskjöld, 
since 1935 adviser to the Riksbank and a close ally of Bertil Ohlin and other economists of 
the so-called Stockholm School, supported a modern approach (Jonung 1991). But as we 
  9
will try to show below, the narrative sources clearly suggest that the governor was by far the 
most influential figure. 
In a first step, we studied the same documents as other researchers, namely the minutes of 
the Governing Board and the official publications. In a second step we also looked for 
sources of private communication in order to have a more direct access to the inner thoughts 
of policy makers. Two discoveries were of particular value: the correspondence of the Bank 
of England with the Riksbank and other Swedish authorities, and the private correspondence 
of Ivar Rooth, the Governor of the Riksbank.13 
These latter documents clearly show that the Riksbank never intended to adopt price level 
targeting, but was primarily concerned about a stable sterling rate of the krona. We cite 
three letters in order to support our claim. First, in late September 1933 Rooth wrote to 
O.M.W. Sprague, Harvard professor of economics and temporary assistant to the United 
States Secretary of the Treasury.14 For obvious reasons – the US had suspended the gold 
standard in the spring of 1933 –, Sprague was interested in the Swedish experience with 
managing its currency. Rooth answered that in the months following the fall of the krona, 
the Riksbank was mainly concerned with emergency measures: it replenished its foreign 
exchange reserves and was coping with the consequences of the Kreuger crash. But once 
these problems were solved by the end of May 1932, ‘we decided to try to keep sterling 
steady around 19.50 which was the actual level at that time’. Rooth gave four reasons for 
the sterling peg: in order to help exports, to halt deflation, to increase liquidity which drove 
down interest rates, and finally to encourage Swedish holders of foreign bonds to repatriate 
their money and to sell their foreign exchange to the Riksbank. Thus, stabilising prices was 
only one of four major goals. A stable exchange rate was the priority, not price level 
targeting. Therefore, Rooth concluded: 
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My personal opinion is that it is of the utmost importance to the whole economic life 
of a nation which like Sweden for its standard of living is to such a great extent 
depending upon foreign trade, to have fairly stable quotations. I think that I dare say 
that also in order to get a rising price-level, stable foreign exchanges are better than 
the erratic movements of these rates which the world has suffered from ever since 
September 1931. 
There had only been one episode, Rooth added, in which the Riksbank deviated from this 
course. At the end of October 1932, when the British pound weakened against the US 
dollar, ‘we unpegged sterling’, as he put it, and let the krona appreciate considerably. After 
sterling recovered and the krona weakened because the Swedish Finance Ministry publicly 
demanded a more expansionary monetary policy and the government nominated some 
experts to discuss the future of monetary policy, the krona depreciated to the level of 19.50 
kronor per sterling and then pegged it again to the British pound. 
A second citation is taken from a critical comment Rooth gave on Bertil Ohlin’s in Zurich in 
early 1936.15 Rooth rejected Ohlin’s claim that the Riksbank had sought a stable exchange 
rate vis-à-vis sterling because it shared the same monetary policy goals as the Bank of 
England. The true reason had been, he argued, that Sweden’s foreign business was for the 
most part invoiced in sterling: ‘It was particularly important for a small country like Sweden 
depending so strongly on its foreign trade to inspire trade and industry with trust in our 
currency.’ The stable sterling rate, he went on, had also contributed to the transmission of 
the inflationary tendency of English prices to Sweden. And he concluded that pegging the 
krona to sterling and lowering interest rates were ‘the only thing we did in order to influence 
prices’.16 
A third statement is even more telling. In February 1938, Rooth wrote to Randolph Burgess, 
Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: 
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Some American professors, e.g. Professor Irving Fisher, believe that it is an 
achievement by us in the Riksbank that prices have been fairly steady up to the 
middle of 1936. I have told Professor Fisher before and I am sorry to have to tell you 
now that what we have done is merely that we have carried out a fairly conservative 
central banking policy. In fact we have never tried to do anything directly with 
regard to prices.17 
Of course, all three of Rooth’s statements are ex-post assessments. But there is sufficient 
evidence suggesting that his memory did not distort the past in a fundamental way. Other 
archival sources confirm that the Riksbank’s main concern was to have a stable sterling 
parity, and it reached this goal by following the policy of the Bank of England and by first 
accumulating and then actively managing foreign exchange reserves. Certainly, Rooth was 
also concerned about prices, but drawing from his experience during the gold standard 
period, he was convinced that only a stable exchange rate could provide a reliable nominal 
anchor and thus guarantee price stability in the long run. The domestic purchasing power of 
the krona, he stated shortly after the suspension of the gold standard, was ‘certainly not a 
sufficiently firm foothold’.18 Thus, he appears to have made an honest statement when 
explaining that the Riksbank had practiced a fairly conservative central banking policy. 
As for the setting of discount rates, the minutes of the Board show that the Riksbank wanted 
to make sure the Swedish rate would never fall below the British one, and it was only ready 
to lower it when the Bank of England took the same step (figure 4). The only time the Board 
acted on its own was in the aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard in September 
1931. On 8 and 19 October, it cut the discount rate from eight to six percent, whereas the 
Bank of England kept it at six percent. These decisions, however, were not the expression of 
an independent course, but resulted from the insight that in order to contain inflation after a 
steep depreciation of the krona it was not necessary to have such a high interest rate.19 The 
Riksbank had decided to increase the discount rate from six to a record high of eight percent 
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on 27 September, i.e. on the same day Finance Minister Hamrin announced the suspension 
of the gold standard and made his famous statement on the future course of Sweden’s 
monetary policy. The exceptionally high interest rate was part of the campaign to reassure 
the public that the authorities would not allow inflation to emerge and investors to speculate 
against the krona.20 
[Figure 4 about here] 
A clear sign that Rooth consciously avoided stepping out of line with British policy is his 
opposition to a discount rate cut on 14 January 1932.21 One member of the Board proposed 
it because Swedish business leaders had protested against the restrictive policy for some 
time, but Rooth prevailed with his cautious approach. Only when the Bank of England 
lowered its rate from six to five percent on 18 February, he was ready to relax monetary 
conditions, though still reluctantly, for he wrote to London on the same day that he was very 
surprised by the British decision and asked ironically: ‘What has happened? Has any of the 
Indian maharadjas sent you all their gold, are you preparing a conversion of the Warloan or 
have you decided to follow the suggestion made in the last copy of The Economist, viz. to 
“reflate” the prices to the level of 1928?’22 Due to his mistrust against expansionary 
policies, Rooth proposed to follow the Bank of England only halfway to 5.5 percent and to 
wait for the consequences.23 Two weeks later, with the fear of inflation diminishing, the 
Riksbank lowered the discount rate by another half percent in order to bring it down to the 
British level – the reference to the Bank of England being a crucial argument.24 In the 
following months, the Riksbank continued to follow the British policy, although with some 
time lag. From March to June, the Bank of England cut the discount rate from five to two 
percent, the Riksbank lowered it to 3.5 percent in the second and third quarter of 1932 and 
to 2.5 percent in the course of the following year. Again, the decisions were inspired by the 
policy of the Bank of England.25 
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As for the management of the exchange rate, again Rooth’s memory proved to be accurate. 
Only in the immediate aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard, the Riksbank was 
hesitating to seek an exchange rate peg since the situation remained chaotic for some weeks. 
Rooth considered the stabilisation of the domestic price level only as a temporary policy to 
prevent inflation and to reassure the public. His next goal was to tie the krona to sterling as 
soon as the future path of British monetary policy would take shape. Accordingly, 
Siepmann, a close adviser of Governor Montagu Norman, reported to the British Treasury in 
mid-October that according to Rooth the Riksbank’s attempt ‘to control exchange in such a 
way as to maintain the stability of internal prices’ was the only alternative ‘in a period of 
transition’. And he added that before going to a meeting at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in Basle Rooth ‘was frequently asking me over the telephone for 
indications of our policy’.26 One week later, Siepmann summarised another telephone 
conversation with Rooth: ‘He told me again that Sweden can have no monetary policy 
except to keep internal prices stable, so far as possible, until our decision is known.’27 
Since the British themselves did not know what kind of monetary policy they should pursue, 
Rooth did not receive a clear answer. Nevertheless, a few weeks later he became convinced 
that the moment for a sterling peg had come. His decision was motivated by a rapid fall of 
the krona against sterling from late October on (figure 5). According to the minutes of the 
Board Rooth had strong reservations against exchange rate fluctuations and was afraid of 
speculative attacks against a weakening krona.28 A close friend of his, who endorsed the 
sterling peg, believed that ‘now the British pound plays the role of gold’.29 On 18 
November, Rooth got the approval of the Board, informed the Bank of England, and then 
turned to the commercial banks for help, because the Riksbank was still suffering from the 
depletion of its foreign exchange reserves following the defense of the gold standard two 
months earlier.30 He convinced them to ration their credits on a voluntary basis in order to 
improve the trade balance and to impede speculation against the krona.31 Whether or not the 
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agreement with commercial banks stabilised the exchange rate is hard to say, but it almost 
certainly hampered the recovery of the economy (Lester 1939). In any case, the krona only 
temporarily fell below the old sterling parity. Rooth succeeded in implementing his 
exchange rate stabilisation scheme. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Thus, only two months after the declaration by the Finance Minister and a few weeks after 
the exchange with the economists about a new monetary policy, the Riksbank violated the 
new guidelines by seeking a sterling peg at the old parity. The maneuver reversed the 
recovery of wholesale prices and subsequently would have depressed Swedish consumer 
prices if the Kreuger crash in March 1932 had not forced the Riksbank to be more 
expansionary.32 Accordingly, the maneuver was not well received by the press and the 
political authorities.33 In reaction to the widespread criticism, the Riksbank tried to reassure 
the government of its loyalty by adding a few paragraphs in the upcoming formal request for 
another renewal of the provisional suspension of the gold standard. As mentioned above, 
these lines written on 11 February 1932 have been cited as an expression of its commitment 
to price level targeting. Yet, a closer reading of this key text reveals that the Riksbank, while 
endorsing the overall goal of price stability, gave only lukewarm support to the new 
guidelines by pointing out that ‘for the time being each monetary program can only be valid 
until further notice’.34 Consequently, the Banking Committee of the Riksdag was not 
entirely satisfied with the explanation of the Riskbank and sent a questionnaire while 
preparing its famous May report cited above.35 The Committee also tried to make sure that 
by spelling out a more specific monetary program and openly criticizing the deflationary 
bias of the Riksbank it could better control its policy. The result of this endeavor was 
negative, however. By introducing the phrase that monetary policy should not only be aimed 
at stabilizing the domestic price level, but also be based based on ‘the needs of the 
economy’, the monetary program became fuzzy. They also blurred the lines by stating that 
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monetary policy should not be schematically bound to any special price index. And in any 
case, further events would show that the wishes of the deputies were not particularly 
relevant for the Board of the Riksbank. 
The Kreuger crash in mid-March 1932 forced the Riksbank to step in as lender of last resort 
and triggered a selling wave of krona assets. The Riksbank tried to defend the old sterling 
parity, but due to the lack of foreign exchange reserves, it had to give up its resistance.36 
The exchange rate regime remained the same, however: in May, when the storm was over, 
the Riksbank tied the krona back to the British pound at 19.50 kronor per sterling – in his 
letter to Sprague Rooth referred to this decision as the beginning of the sterling peg which 
lasted until the end of the 1930s. 
In the following months, Swedish wholesale and consumer prices remained almost perfectly 
stable. Some scholars have interpreted this restoration of price stability as a success of the 
Riksdag. The Riksbank, they argue, had to accept certain restrictions imposed by the 
Banking Committee’s May report and thus explicitly adopted price level targeting.37 This 
view is, however, hard to reconcile with the facts. First, there are no archival sources hinting 
to a change of mind within the Riksbank. Second, the depreciation of the krona was not 
allowed on a voluntary basis, but forced upon policy makers. The Riksbank would have 
preferred maintaining the old sterling parity regardless of the deflationary effect of such a 
policy. And third, further events would show that the Riksbank continued to aim for the old 
parity. The undervaluation of the krona mainly served to replenish foreign exchange 
reserves in order to have the means to drive the krona towards the former level. The 
opportunity came in the fall of 1932 when the British pound weakened considerably. In the 
beginning of this phase, the Riksbank let the krona depreciate, but after 20 November it 
stabilised the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar and thus brought the krona back to the 
old sterling parity (figure 5). When in December the British pound reversed its course and 
appreciated against the US dollar, the Riksbank maintained this parity, inducing a 
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considerable real appreciation of the krona and a decline of wholesale prices.38 The 
operation failed, however. In early 1933, the krona was not strong enough to follow the 
British pound in its upward movement and fell back to a lower level although the Riksbank 
tried to stem the tide by buying kronor and selling British pounds. 
Thus, like in November 1931, the Riksbank openly violated the guidelines set up by the 
government and the parliament. The first to have noticed it was Lester (1939) who talked to 
key policy makers at the time. It is difficult to add written evidence to this interpretation 
because, curiously, all the minutes of the relevant Board meetings have disappeared. 
However, we found one clear piece of evidence showing that Rooth wished to bring the 
krona back to the old sterling parity. In late October 1932, a close friend reminded him of a 
recent conversation about the future exchange rate of the krona: ‘… when I expressed my 
hope that the krona would appreciate against sterling, you explained that nobody awaited 
such a movement more eagerly than you.’39 In addition, the comparison with the sterling 
rate of the Norwegian krone is revealing in this respect: whereas the Norwegian krone 
appreciated only by 2.5 percent against sterling (from 19.90 in September to 19.41 in 
December), the Swedish krona climbed by six percent towards the old sterling parity (from 
19.50 in September to 18.32 in December). Clearly, the difference was due to the more 
aggressive exchange rate management by the Riksbank. It was not a natural result of market 
forces. 
In reaction to this deflationary monetary policy, Finance Minister Ernst Wigforss of the 
Social Democrats appointed a committee of experts whose recommendations were adopted 
by the Banking Committee and the Riksdag. As mentioned, the Committee demanded that 
the Riksbank should allow a moderate rise of the internal wholesale price level, but was free 
how to implement this strategy. Besides, it repeated the conclusion of its own report of May 
1932 that the krona should not be fixed to gold or to the British pound. Nevertheless, in July 
1933 the Riksbank explicitly tied the krona to the British pound at the current rate (19.40 
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kronor per sterling).40 According to Rooth’s letter to Randolph Burgess, the Vice-President 
of the New York Fed, which we cited above, the Banking Committee’s report was 
irrelevant: ‘In 1933 the banking committee wrote a fairly theoretical programme about the 
necessity of increasing prices. However, they said that the decisions to be taken in each case 
had to be made by ourselves and that we had to take the responsibility for the decisions.’41 
The timing of the decision and the fact that Denmark and Norway established a sterling peg 
at the same time suggest that two factors were important: the conclusion of a trade 
agreement of all three Scandinavian countries with the UK in May 1933 and the failure of 
the London World Economic Conference that became apparent after Roosevelt’s bombshell 
message in early July 1933. 
In any case, besides the obvious violation of the Banking Committee’s opposition to an 
exchange rate peg, the crucial question is whether the krona was pegged to sterling in order 
to fulfill the monetary program or in order to stabilise the exchange rate for its own sake. As 
in the beginning there was no conflict of interest, the question is hard to answer. The price 
level remained very stable because British wholesale prices and the dollar rate of sterling 
finally stabilised after an extended period of fluctuations. Yet, when in the second half of 
1936 British wholesale and consumer prices increased by roughly ten percent, a sterling peg 
could not be reconciled with price level targeting anymore. Accordingly, several Swedish 
economists, among them Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher, correctly pointed out that the 
Riksbank should unpeg the krona from sterling and allow an appreciation in order to keep 
the domestic price level constant (figure 7). Investors were also expecting a strengthening of 
the krona and exchanged foreign exchange for krona – the reserves of the Riksbank almost 
doubled from the middle of 1936 and to late 1937. The Governing Board, however, did not 
change its policy, although it knew what was at stake. In a letter to Montagu Norman at 
New Year’s Eve, Rooth not only wished a Happy New Year, but also mentioned that the 
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krona perhaps would be revalued against sterling. Norman drily remarked in an internal 
memo: 
The Swedes have made a lot of noise about their new monetary policy of basing the 
level of the krona on a price index and thus maintaining the level of prices. In fact 
they have up till now had to do nothing but keep pegged on sterling and we have 
kept their prices steady for them. Rooth is certainly thinking hard about raising the 
krona rate on sterling, and if sterling prices show a strong rising tendency he will 
probably do something. His letter is, I think, meant to warn us about this and to 
express the hope that if and when he moves his rate on sterling we shall pat him on 
the back and not accuse him of upsetting things and disturbing the currency 
agreement.42 
Stockholm’s uneasiness becomes also apparent in a note which a senior official of the 
Foreign Office sent to the Treasury and ultimately to the Bank of England: 
At the Swedish Legation last night Mr. Sandler [Swedish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs] took me aside and said that he wanted to ask my views about the Swedish 
exchange. (…). I said that was a matter on which I could offer no opinion. … there 
would be no sort of objection from our side if the Swedish Government thought it 
right to go back to their old parity. (…). The question was essentially one which the 
Swedish Government had to settle by reference to its own internal situation rather 
than by reference to what was being done in any other country.43  
By the end of April 1937, when Swedish consumer prices had risen by four percent over the 
preceding two quarters and did not stop increasing, the Riksbank decided to maintain a 
stable sterling rate, thus once more violating the principles of price level targeting.44 The 
arguments put forward by Rooth reveal how strongly he believed in the virtue of having a 
stable exchange rate. First, he warned of the negative psychological effects of changing the 
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parity. Second, he pointed out that a revaluation of the krona would only temporarily stop 
the rise of domestic prices. World prices would continue to increase and to drive Swedish 
prices upward, no matter what the Riksbank was doing. The option of letting the krona float 
in order to uncouple the Swedish economy from world inflation was not even taken into 
consideration. In Rooth’s view exchange rate stability was ‘the most important condition for 
international trade’, whereas flexible exchange rates would only lead to protectionism and 
hamper trade. Third, a revaluation of the krona would reduce the profitability of the 
exporting sectors, even more so as Finland and Norway, both direct competitors, were not 
considering such a step. And finally, he expressed his hope, without giving any evidence, 
that the rise of British price would soon stop. Clearly, these arguments were not compatible 
with a modern monetary policy. 
In sum, narrative evidence shows that in four instances the Riksbank consciously acted 
against the principles of price level targeting. First, in November 1931, it prevented the 
krona from falling below the old sterling parity, thus reversing the recovery of Swedish 
wholesale prices. If the Kreuger crash in March 1932 had not made the exchange rate 
depreciate by 7 percent, Sweden would have experienced a marked deflation in 1932. 
Second, in the last quarter of 1932 the Riksbank made the krona climb to the old sterling 
parity, thus inducing a steep real appreciation and depressing wholesale and consumer 
prices. Again, the outcome would have been even worse, if further events had not driven the 
sterling rate of the krona back to the level where it had been before the adventurous 
maneuver. Third, the Riksbank explicitly pegged the krona in July 1933, although the 
Banking Committee of the Riksdag had clearly excluded such a policy. And finally, in early 
1937 the Riksbank refused to unpeg the krona after British wholesale prices dramatically 
rose. Instead, by doing nothing it imported inflation and let the domestic price level increase 
by five percent within two quarters. On the basis of this evidence, it seems hard to maintain 
the claim that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting. The primary goal was rather 
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to advance the recovery of the exporting sectors by stabilizing the exchange rate, first at the 
old parity, then at an undervalued level. 
 
5. Econometric evidence 
To test the qualitative evidence from the previous section, we run a Bayesian VAR covering 
the period from 1920 to 1939. In contrast to the traditional structural VAR, the Bayesian 
approach allows for time varying parameter matrices and heteroscedasticity, thus enabling 
us to analyse monetary policy across regime changes not only in terms of changes in the 
transmission mechanism, but also in terms of a change in the nature of the structural shocks. 
In particular, we can observe whether or not the end of the gold standard in 1931 
represented such a change. The set-up of the model is explained in the Appendix. 
The crucial question is whether the Riksbank was trying to stabilize the price level after 
1931 as official declarations suggest or whether it continued to target the sterling rate as 
under the gold standard regime lasting from 1924 to 1931. We are aware of the fact that 
these two strategies need not to be mutually exclusive. It is possible that the central bank 
was stabilizing the domestic price level by maintaining a sterling peg. The evidence 
assembled in the last section suggests, however, that the Riksbank was primarily targeting 
the exchange rate and not the domestic price level. In some periods, the stable sterling rate 
also delivered price stability, but when in 1936-37 a conflict of interest emerged, the 
Riksbank was ready to accept an increase of domestic prices violating the principles of price 
level targeting. 
The selection of the variables is straightforward. The Riksbank’s monetary policy is 
measured by the discount rate and alternatively the monetary base. We consider both series 
because the Riksbank is not changing its discount rate after 1933 anymore as figure 4 
shows. Yet, as expected, the choice of the monetary variable does not change the basic 
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results. In order to account for the changing relationship between exchange rate and price 
stability we chose the British discount rate, the nominal exchange rate (krona against 
sterling) and two Swedish price indices (wholesale prices and cost of living) as our main 
variables influencing the Riksbank’s monetary policy. The British discount rate is picked 
because the narrative evidence shows that the Riksbank stabilised the exchange rate by 
following the discount rate steps taken by the Bank of England.45 Finally, to account for 
other factors possibly influencing the monetary policy of the Riksbank we include two other 
variables: the business cycle of the real economy and the movement of gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. To reflect the business cycle, we used union data of Swedish 
unemployment in absence of monthly indices of industrial production covering the whole 
period. It would be surprising if the Swedish monetary authorities had reacted to the output 
gap as modern central banks do. But is it essential as a control variable. Introducing the 
reserve variable allows us to see whether or not the Riksbank follows the ‘rules of the 
game’. Under the gold standard regime, central banks are supposed to raise interest rates 
when reserves are approaching or falling below a certain minimum. In Sweden, the legal 
limit of the gold cover ratio was 40 percent during most of the period under study. However, 
note that, by including foreign exchange reserves into the cover ratio, we have used a broad 
definition of this indicator. We believe that the focus on the gold cover ratio is too narrow in 
our case because it does not account for the reason why Sweden suspended the gold 
exchange standard in late September 1931. As mentioned above, this regime shift was not 
primarily due to close trade relations with Great Britain, but to Sweden’s foreign short-term 
debt. Even prior to the fall of sterling, the Riksbank was running out of foreign exchange 
reserves while the gold reserves remained relatively stable. Only in the final stage, did the 
Riksbank also begin to use them in order to defend the gold standard. More generally, 
foreign exchange reserves reflect market forces and economic policies better than gold 
reserves. 
 In short, the Bayesian VAR has six variables: the discount rate of the Bank of England (I*), 
the nominal sterling rate of the krona (E), the Swedish unemployment rate (U), the Swedish 
price index (WPI or CPI), the gold and foreign exchange cover ratio (GCR) and the 
monetary policy variable (I or M0). The British discount rate can be considered exogenous 
as it is evident that the monetary policy of the Bank of England was not influenced by the 
economic development of a small open economy such as Sweden. Moreover, treating I* as 
exogenous variable allows a more parsimonious specification of the VAR. The monetary 
data are taken from the Bank of England and the Riksbank, the consumer prices from the 
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) and the Economist, the 
unemployment rate from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen). 
All data are on a monthly basis. 
The main results displayed in Figures 3.1 to 3.8 show the posterior distributions of impulse 
responses (lag 3, lag 6, lag 9, and lag 12). The 95% highest posterior density intervals (lag 3 
lag 6, and lag 12) can be found in Tables 1 and 2.46   
Did the Riksbank adopt price level targeting? If this had been the case, we would expect a 
significant reaction of the Swedish discount rate or the monetary base to a price shock. In 
both cases, however, the impulse responses reveal quite the opposite. The Swedish 
monetary policy indicators hardly move, regardless of the index and the duration of the lag. 
In this respect, the Bayesian VAR provides strong evidence supporting what the statements 
of the Riksbank governor Rooth suggest, namely that the actual policy did not match the 
official declarations made by the Finance Ministry and the Banking Committee of the 
Swedish parliament. Up to lag 6, the Swedish interest rate increases in response to a British 
interest rate shock. In contrast, when we use the Swedish monetary base we do not see a 
strong reaction of the Riksbank. 
[Figures 3.1-3.4 around here] 
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Regardless of the monetary variable we use the impulse responses strongly suggest that 
there was no regime change in the early 1930s. This observations amounts to a further 
argument against the hypothesis that the Riksbank in fact adopted price level targeting after 
the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931. Keeping nominal exchange rate 
completely stable after 1932, in addition to following the British discount rate without 
obvious structural break requires price levels to adjust – this finding is not in line with 
stabilizing the price level as target of Swedish monetary policy. 
In conclusion, econometric evidence demonstrates that the basic orientation of Sweden’s 
monetary policy remained constant throughout the interwar years and that the Riksbank did 
not adopt price level targeting in the 1930s. Its main priority was to maintain a stable 
exchange sterling rate by following the discount rate policy of the Bank of England. Thus, 
the Bayesian VAR strongly supports the main findings drawn from the narrative sources.  
[Tables 1 and 2 around here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the 1930s, Sweden’s monetary policy was admired for its success in stabilizing the 
domestic price level after 1931 while most other European countries needed more time to 
dig themselves out of the deflationary spiral. According to Irving Fisher the success was due 
to a regime change in 1931: instead of targeting the exchange rate, Riksbank from now on 
aimed its policy at stabilizing consumer prices, similarly like today’s inflation targeters. 
Since the publication of Jonung (1979a) this positive view has been revised. In particular, 
the belief that the Riksbank fully abandoned exchange rate targeting in favor of price level 
targeting has been rejected. Yet, inspite of this strong skepticism towards the actual practice, 
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the new conventional view still claims that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting 
which imposed certain restrictions on its monetary policy. 
In this paper, we try to show that this view is inconsistent. By employing a Bayesian VAR 
and analyzing new archival sources we have come to the conclusion that the Riksbank not 
only gave priority of exchange rate stabilisation over price level stabilisation, but also never 
intended to adopt price level targeting. As governor Ivar Rooth himself repeatedly pointed 
out in private letters, his aim was to have stable exchange rates in order to foster trade and to 
have a strong anchor for monetary policy. Following this conviction stemming from his 
experience during the gold standard period before and after World War I, he did not hesitate 
to violate the principles of price level targeting when he believed that the exchange rate 
needed to be stabilised. 
This finding raises the question as to what extent the 1930s were a defining moment in 
Europe’s monetary history. Sweden has often been cited as an important example of how 
some policy makers broke with the past. We already know that fiscal policy was much less 
counter-cyclical and innovative than many observers originally thought.47 The results of this 
paper suggest that the same is true for monetary policy. The Riksbank could have pursued a 
more flexible monetary policy, but it did not even try because policy makers regarded 
floating exchange rates as harmful to trade and investment.48  
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Table 1: Highest Posterior Density Intervals (68 Per Cent) for the Responses to Price Level Shocks 
 CPI WPI 
Interest Rate Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 
Jan 26 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 27 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 28 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 29 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 30 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 31 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 32 -0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 33 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 34 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 35 -0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 36 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 37 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 38 -0.008 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 39 -0.010 0.010 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.010 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Monetary 
Base Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 
Jan 26 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 27 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 28 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 29 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 30 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 31 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 32 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 33 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 34 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 35 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 36 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 37 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 38 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Jan 39 -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
For an interpretation of highest posterior density intervals, see footnote 46. 
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Table 2: Highest Posterior Density Intervals (68 Per Cent) for the Responses to British Interest Rate Shocks 
 CPI WPI 
Interest Rate Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 
Jan 26 0.011 0.041 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.039 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Jan 27 0.010 0.041 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.040 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Jan 28 0.010 0.042 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.040 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Jan 29 0.009 0.040 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.038 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Jan 30 0.007 0.039 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.039 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Jan 31 0.006 0.038 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.041 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Jan 32 0.006 0.038 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.041 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Jan 33 0.006 0.039 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.040 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Jan 34 0.008 0.042 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.043 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Jan 35 0.007 0.043 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.044 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Jan 36 0.007 0.043 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.043 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Jan 37 0.006 0.044 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.047 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Jan 38 0.005 0.044 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.045 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Jan 39 0.004 0.044 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.049 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.001 
Monetary 
Base Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 
Jan 26 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 27 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 28 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 29 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 30 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 31 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 32 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 33 -0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Jan 34 -0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Jan 35 -0.010 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Jan 36 -0.010 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Jan 37 -0.012 0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Jan 38 -0.014 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.013 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Jan 39 -0.014 0.008 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.010 -0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 
For an interpretation of highest posterior density intervals, see footnote 46. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scandinavian exchange rates
(percentage of prewar gold parity, monthly data)
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 Figure 2: Index of cost of living by Riksbank and
by National Board of Health and Welfare (monthly data)
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 Figure 3.1: Response of Swedish Discount Rate to Price Level Shocks (One Standard 
Deviation) 
1925 1930 1935 1940
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 3
CPI
1925 1930 1935 1940
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 3
WPI
1925 1930 1935 1940
-2
-1
0
1
2
x 10-3
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 6
1925 1930 1935 1940
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10-3
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 6
1925 1930 1935 1940
-2
-1
0
1
2
x 10-4
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 1
2
1925 1930 1935 1940
-2
-1
0
1
2
x 10-4
Year
R
es
po
ns
e 
at
 L
ag
 1
2
 
The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines are the 25 per cent and 75 per cent quantiles. 
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 Figure 3.2: Response of Swedish Monetary Base to Price Level Shocks (One Standard 
Deviation) 
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines are the 25 per cent and 75 per cent quantiles. 
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 Figure 3.3: Response of Swedish Discount Rate to British Interest Rate Shock (One 
Standard Deviation) 
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines are the 25 per cent and 75 per cent quantiles. 
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 Figure 3.4: Response of Swedish Monetary Base to British Interest Rate Shock (One 
Standard Deviation) 
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines are the 25 per cent and 75 per cent quantiles. 
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Figure 4: Discount rates of Bank of England and  Riksbank (monthly data)
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 Figure 5: Sterling rate of krona and wholesale prices of Sweden and UK
(monthly data)
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Figure 6: Geweke's χ2 Test: Interest Rate Model 
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 Figure 7: Geweke's χ2 Test: Money Stock Model 
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Appendix: Time-varying VAR 
The vector autoregressive (VAR) model is basend on Primiceri’s (2005) extension of the 
approach by Cogley and Sargent (2005). It allows for both time-varying parameters and 
heteroscedasticity. Consider an n variables VAR of order p with t=1,…T observations: 
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Note that both the parameter matrices Aj,t and the variance-covariance matrix Ωt are time 
varying. Vectorisation of the last line in equation (1) gives 
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 where Σt is the time-varying scaling matrix for the structural shocks εt, and Bt is the matrix 
modeling the contemporaneous interaction between the variables in the system. In the case 
of Cogley and Sargent (2005), this matrix is constant over time, in the version of Primiceri 
(2005) used here, the parameters are time-varying. This has the advantage that the 
contemporaneous response of the system to structural shocks is time dependent. However, 
the triangular structure which allows identification does not change over time. The 
equations of movement for the elements of the VAR parameter matrices and the 
components of the variance-covariance matrix are random walks: 
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The last line ensures that the standard deviations are non-negative. By assumption, the 
errors are not correlated among each others and follow multivariate normal distributions: 
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To parameterise as parsimoniously as possible, we fix the order of the VAR to 1, and  use 
UK interest rates as exogenous variables. To arrive at the posterior distribution of the 
parameters, we have 4 MCMC steps (for details, see Primiceri 2005): 
1. Draw αt conditional on bt, σt, t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix Q (the 
variance-covariance matrix for the structural shocks εt is fixed to be an identity 
matrix, see equations 2 and 4). Draws for which the VAR turns out to be unstable 
are rejected. The prior distribution for αt is independent normal, with expected value 
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and variance covariance matrix coming from an OLS estimation of a time-constant 
VAR based on the first 50 observations. 
2. Generate bt conditional on αt, σt, t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix S. 
The prior distribution of bt is independent normal; the expected value comes from 
the lower triangular component of an LDL-decomposition of the error variance-
covariance matrix of the OLS estimation in step 1, and the variance covariance- 
matrix is set to the identity matrix. 
3. Generate σt conditional on αt, bt, t=1, …,T, and the variance-covariance matrix W. 
The prior distribution for log σt is also independent normal, with an expected value 
coming from the diagonal component of an LDL-decomposition of the error 
variance covariance matrix of the OLS estimation in step 1, and the variance 
covariance- matrix is set to the identity matrix. 
For step 1 to 3, the conditional posteriors turn out to be normal. In each case, the 
underlying model is a state-space model (e.g., Harvey 1992), and the sequence of 
time varying parameters is generated following the multi-move Gibbs sampling 
approach proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994).  
4. In the last step, the variance-covariance matrices Q, S, and W are drawn from an 
inverted Wishart distribution, conditional on αt, bt, σt, t=1,…,T. The parameters of 
the inverted Wishart prior for Q come from the OLS estimation in step 1, and for S 
and W, they are set to I×1e-2. 
The entire procedure is repeated 60000 times, and the first 10000 draws are discarded. After 
burn-in, we keep every 10th realization of the chain. To judge convergence of the chain, we 
calculated the Geweke’s χ2-test (e.g. Geweke 2005, p. 149-150). Since there are too many 
parameters to look at, convergence is demonstrated for the maximum absolute eigenvalue of 
the VAR parameter matrix A at each point in time, comparing the mean over a subsample of 
 the first 10 per cent of realizations of the chain with the mean based on the last 50 per cent. 
The numerical standard errors used to construct this test statistic are based on periodogram 
estimates at frequency zero with 4 per cent, 8 per cent and 15 per cent autocovariance 
tapers.49 The probabilities that the two means are the same are displayed in Figures 1 
(interest rate model) and 2  (money stock model). The Figures show that convergence is not 
a problem here. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
It is straightforward to calculate the distribution of the impulse-response matrix at lag j and 
time t from the distribution of the VAR-parameters and the stochastic volatilities (note that 
since the lag is set to one, we have just one parameter matrix): 
.1, tt
j
ttj ΣBAIR
−=      (5) 
 43
  44
                                                
 
 
 
1 For the older literature see Kock (1931, 1933), Ohlin (1932), Kjellström (1934), Lindahl (1936), Thomas 
(1936), Montgomery (1938) and Lester (1939). Eichengreen (1992) based his account on these contemporary 
studies and Jonung (1979a). 
2 We use the most common definition of Scandinavia meaning Denmark, Norway and Sweden and excluding 
Finland and Iceland. 
3 Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo (1997). 
4 Bankoutskottets utlåtande Nr 40, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll 1932 (May), p. 8: ‘... att penningpolitiken 
syntes böra inriktas på att med till buds stående medel bevara den svenska kronans inhemska köpkraft.’ 
5 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 8 October 1931, p. 83. 
6 The questionnaire and the responses of Cassel, Davidson and Heckscher can be found at Archives Riksbank, 
Rooth papers, Box 124. See also Jonung (1979b) for a detailed discussion of the economists’ report. 
7 The letter to the government is attached to the minutes of the Board: Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 
11 February 1932, p. 9. 
8 From its foundation in 1668 until the late 1990s, the Riksbank was owned and controlled by the Riksdag, not 
by the government or the King. In 1999, the Riksdag decided to give the Riksbank an independent status. 
9 Bankoutskottets utlåtande Nr 40, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll 1932 (May). A short version is given in 
Bankoutskottets memorial Nr 1, 1933, p. 4. See also Berg and Jonung (1999) for a summary of this report. 
10 The twelve-man committee was created by the Social Democratic Finance Minister Ernst Wigforss and 
finished its discussions at the end of April 1933. It consisted of business leaders, two conservative economists 
(Cassel, Heckscher), a farmer, and a union representative. The report is published in Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 
nr 260 till 1933 års riksdag. 
11 Bankoutskottets utlåtande Nr. 52, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll 1933 (June). A summary is given in 
Bankoutskottets memorial Nr 1, 1934, p. 6. 
12 In his memoirs, Wigforss (1951), pp. 366-367, shows little respect for Riksbank governor Ivar Rooth. 
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13 The Rooth papers at the Riksbank archive are among the most valuable sources of Swedish monetary policy 
in the 1930s, but have not been fully exploited yet. The correspondence between the Riksbank and the Bank of 
England is well documented in the archives of the Bank of England. 
14 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26 (26 September 1933). 
15 The Zurich Economic Society originally wanted to have Rooth himself as speaker, but he was not available. 
See Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box  93 (correspondence with Swiss National Bank). 
16 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/4 (January 1936). The text is in German, the English summary attached 
to the document is not very accurate. 
17 Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (10 February 1938). 
18 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 7 October 1931, p. 81. 
19 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 7 October and 17 October 1931, pp. 81 and 87. 
20 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 27 September 1931, p. 72. See also Rooth’s speech to the Swedish 
industrial federation in early October 1931: Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 127. 
21 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 14 January 1932, p. 3. 
22 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/25 (18 February 1932). 
23 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 18 February 1932, pp. 13-17. 
24 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 2 March 1932. 
25 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 13 May and 31 August 1932. 
26 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/24 (19 October 1931). 
27 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/24 (26 October 1931). 
28 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 18 November 1931, p. 109. 
29 Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (19 November 1931). 
30 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/24 (20 November 1931). 
31 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 21 November 1931, pp. 113-114, and the attached letter to the King 
and the government (21 November 1931). The terms of the agreement are also attached to the särskilt 
protokoll. The Riksbank first discussed an increase of the discount rate, but concluded it would be too costly 
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for the economy. See a list of arguments for and against this measure and further background papers in 
Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Boxes 127 and 129. 
32 Thanks to the Kreuger crash and the subsequent readjustment of the Riksbank’s policy, Swedish wholesale 
prices declined by two percent in early 1932 and consumer prices remained stable. A continued sterling peg 
would have caused more deflation: British wholesale prices fell by roughly ten percent from December 1931, 
to June 1932, and British consumer prices by almost seven percent during the same period. 
33 The negative press reports were also registered by the Bank of England, OV 29/1 (5 December 1931). 
34 The letter to the government is attached to the minutes of the Board: Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 
11 February 1932, p. 9. 
35 For the critical remarks of the Riksdag see Banking Committee, May 1932, p. 13. Bankoutskottets utlåtande, 
2 May 1932, p. 13 
36 In March 1932, the amount of foreign exchange reserves was still below the level of August 1931 (128 m 
kronor). 
37 See for example Kock (1933). 
38 Swedish wholesale prices fell by five percent from November 1932 to March 1933, consumer prices by two 
percent. 
39 Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (28 October 1932). The author of the letter is Gustaf 
Lagercrantz, director of the mortgage company Stockholms Intecknings Garantie Aktiebolag (SIGAB). Rooth 
was a former SIGAB director. 
40 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 13 July 1933, p. 66-67. 
41 Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (10 February 1938). 
42 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/27 (31 December 1936). 
43 Archives Bank of England, OV 29/4 (18 March 1937). 
44 Archives Riksbank, Särskilt protokoll, 30 April 1937, pp. 57-69. 
45 As in the Swedish case and for the same reason, we also tried to work with the UK monetary base. As 
expected from the narrative evidence, we could not find an influence on Swedish monetary policy. 
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46 The highest posterior density interval is the shortest possible 100(1-α)% credible interval, where a credible 
interval for a parameter b is defined as  
 
where p(β | x) is the posterior distribution of β (see e.g. Koop 2003, p. 43-45). We calculate the highest 
posterior density intervals using the modified percentile method (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, p. 763-769). 
47 See for example Gourevitch (1986) and Notermans (2000). 
48 See Straumann (2006) for a comparison of small European states. 
49 To calculate the test statistic, the Matlab functions moment.g and apm.g provided by James LeSage in his 
econometrics toolbox were used (http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/). All the other Matlab code was 
written by Alexander Rathke, Samad Sarferaz, and Ulrich Woitek. 
